A Continental Policy Forum and Workshop on the Role of the Academic Diaspora in the Revitalisation of Africa’s Higher Education

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Executive Summary

The Continental Education Strategy for Africa (2016 – 2025) targets a “qualitative system of education and training to provide the African continent with efficient human resources adapted to African core values and therefore capable of achieving the vision and ambitions of the African Union” (CESA/AU 2016). One key resource targeted by AU member states to ensure that this vision is operationalized in their contexts is the knowledge diaspora. In this report, I detail the historic and ongoing academic diaspora engagements in three countries: Kenya, Rwanda and Ethiopia, towards discerning policies in place or required, programs existing or imperative, and the resource mobilization needed to make national diaspora-inclusive higher education initiatives a reality in these three contexts and on the continent broadly.

This mapping has made clear that the vast majority of diaspora-inclusive higher education interventions in all three countries are as a result of personal or professional diaspora association efforts. At the same time, collaborative ventures between institutions and states with entities such as the Carnegie Corporation, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are increasingly reported. These historic and ongoing initiatives can be built on towards enabling national “systems” that will scale-up and entrench more sustainable knowledge diaspora engagements in their countries of origin. For this to happen, interlocutors report the need for more explicit policies, at both the national and tertiary institution level, which will respond to the needs of this particular demographic. In addition, local, diaspora and private sector financing for these processes can be sourced through, for example, trust funds, of which the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund (EDTF) remains an iconic example. Furthermore, Social Impact Bonds (SIB) and Diaspora Bonds (DB) have been suggested as viable tools to leverage the patriotism of the diaspora towards implementing key national developmental goals. Notwithstanding their feasibility, both country policy frameworks and financing models need to be attuned to the particular social, political and economic dynamics that prevail in situ, and, in particular, both the fragmentation of the diaspora and their (un)willingness to respond to developmental issues financially need to be considered. Overwhelmingly, however, all informants and literature consulted uphold the potential of the academic diaspora to “revitalize” Africa’s higher education goals, which in turn will have cascading effect on both national and regional developmental objectives.
Introduction

Anchored within Agenda 2063, the Continental Education Strategy for Africa (2016 – 2025) targets a “qualitative system of education and training to provide the African continent with efficient human resources adapted to African core values and therefore capable of achieving the vision and ambitions of the African Union” (CESA/AU 2016). To ensure that this happens, a multiscalar and multisectoral approach has been operationalized by the Africa Union and member states, and the pillars and principles of CESA 2016 make evident the breadth of intersecting approaches identified as important towards reaching its objectives. Notwithstanding these targets, a key concern, and taken up in this report, is captured by Guiding Principle 1 of CESA, which states: “Knowledge societies called for by Agenda 2063 are driven by skilled human capital.” In this regard, CESA 2016 - 2025 identifies the current challenges to “knowledge societies” on the continent, vis-à-vis the current quality and access of postsecondary education, when it states:

Quality and relevance of university education have emerged as serious concerns of the sector for some time now. Post-graduate education remains underdeveloped and its contribution to research and innovation remains minuscule. Notwithstanding the meager relevance of the world ranking of universities to the African context, and with the exception of South Africa and Egypt, none of the African universities appears in the top of these rankings. Africa contributes around 1% of the global knowledge, the lowest in the world, and yet remains an exclusive consumer, which further marginalizes it as a producer of knowledge. The impressive growth however grapples with considerable inequities in gender, social class, geographic location, minority groups, and disability among others (CESA 2016, 19).

Against the many resource constraints of the public purse in Africa, and, as a consequence, the restricted economies of post-secondary institutions, there are many obstacles to remedying the “quality and relevance” of tertiary education. This is a situation exacerbated by the high rates of student enrolment on the continent, a percentage that has nearly doubled since 2016 (UNESCO 2019). In pursuit of the twelve strategic objectives of CESA 16 -25, one key approach that can be used to enable both short term and long-term human capital gains to improve university education amidst current conditions is the expertise of the knowledge diaspora. As various studies have shown, this demographic “possesses the capitals, capacities, and even compulsions to build effective, productive, and mutually beneficial and sustainable relationships” between their global institutions and those in Africa (Zeleza 2013, 25; See also Frittelli 2018; European Commission 2015).

In view of this potential, it, therefore, becomes imperative to develop local country-led
frameworks to facilitate these developmental exchanges, while building on and not forgetting, as Foulds and Zeleza (2014) insist, the ongoing “expansive and often innovative relationships that African academic diasporans have forged with scholars and institutions across the continent,” a phenomenon made possible by the high rates of education among sub-Saharan African immigrants in, though not only, the US (Frittelli 2018). In this regard, recent research by Carnegie makes evident the number of African academics going back home, doing research and continuing with “intellectual remittances” often at their own cost (Frittelli 2018). Therefore, these stories of commitment and innovative relationships should not be lost amidst the focus on “deficits” within African academe (Foulds and Zeleza 2014). Further highlighting this, a European Commission report on the African diaspora affirms their networks and influence when back home, so much so that “many international donor organisations are planning to use the help of the African Diaspora in their collaboration efforts” (European Commission 2015).

It is against this background that the the four Carnegie supported African diaspora programs have successfully rallied the African academic diaspora towards strengthening education and training systems on the continent, supporting the “notion that tapping into the expertise and commitment of diaspora academic is a potential best bet mechanism to stimulate excellence in teaching and research” (Moock and Namuddu 2017, vi). However, even with their popularity and the “quick jolt of energy and connectivity” (Moock and Namuddu 2017, 58) they generate, current and ongoing interventions have made explicit the need for more sustained longer-term programs at the scale of the nation.

This research report, enabled as part of a Carnegie and AU supported research project titled A Continental Policy Forum and Workshop on the Role of the Academic Diaspora in the Revitalization of Africa’s Higher Education, contributes towards discerning policies in place or required, programs existing or imperative, and the resource mobilization needed to make diaspora-inclusive higher education initiatives a reality on the continent. I focus, in particular, on three countries: Kenya, Ethiopia and Rwanda. Bringing these interrelated objectives together emerges two core questions that I seek to answer as part of this research process. These are:

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1 Here I refer to the Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Program (CADFP), the University of Ghana Diaspora Linkage Program (UG – DLP), the University of Witwatersrand Alumni Diaspora Program and the CODESRIA African Diaspora Support Program.
1) *What are the historical and ongoing diaspora led interventions in higher education other than Carnegie supported programs on the continent? What are the policy frameworks that support these initiatives, and what successes, milestones and challenges have they enabled?*

2) *What local mechanisms are available or should exist to financially support the enhanced participation of the African diaspora in higher education, research and innovation in Africa?*

To answer these questions, I have adopted a number of complementary methods. These include key informant interviews in all three countries, and a desk review of available documents. I also draw from relevant examples of similar initiatives from Carnegie partner countries on the continent. The next section highlights some of the historic and ongoing diaspora led interventions in higher education that have been conducted outside of Carnegie’s efforts, and is followed by an analysis of the state, regional and non-state frameworks that support these initiatives. Thereafter, I attend to the three country cases studies – Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia – and highlight the various state initiatives intended to rally the diaspora towards improved higher education outcomes, and the policy, programmatic and funding provisions and gaps in each location. Following the case studies, I discuss the funding possibilities that were suggested during the interview process in all three countries, towards enabling locally conceived and financed diaspora-inclusive higher education initiatives. I conclude by summarizing the main results of the research process, and suggesting priorities that can be taken up in the bids towards harnessing productive diasporic intellectual exchanges for the improvement of tertiary education on the continent.

**Interviews and Methodological Limitations**

It is important to point out some of the limitations of this work at the outset. Ultimately, as in any research endeavour, a central concern is the lower number of interviewees consulted when compared with those contacted. In total, I spoke with fifteen interlocutors, although this number represents, admittedly, an uneven amount in the three different countries. From Kenya I was able to speak with five informants including the most senior official at the Diaspora Agency within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CEO of the Commission for University Education (CUE), and the Vice Chancellor of a private university that has a special interest in engaging with the diaspora. It is important to note that the latter two key informants were diaspora returnees, and so offered experiential information about the structural gaps in state-diaspora
engagement. I was also able to speak informally with the persons in charge of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) alumni network and higher education at the British Council in Kenya. In Rwanda, I spoke with three senior employees at the Development Bank of Rwanda (BRD) who worked on education issues. Despite my efforts, it did not prove possible to speak with a senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rwanda, and my repeated visits and emails to the Rwanda High Commission in Kenya bore no fruit. In Ethiopia, despite my short period in the country, I attended a higher education conference, the International Higher Education Forum for Africa (INHEA), which provided crucial information for my research process. In addition, I was also able to conduct interviews and have substantive informal conversations with six interlocutors during this conference. Of particular note are the interviews conducted with the founder and managing director of the Alliance for Brain Gain and Innovative Development (ABIDE), an organization known widely for its knowledge diaspora-inclusive development advocacy, an Ethiopian doctoral student based at Boston College whose research focuses on the country’s knowledge diaspora, an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) departmental head who works in the broad area of the social development of the region, and a professor at Addis Ababa university. Other Ethiopian interlocutors included students and teachers.

While my goal was to conduct twenty key informant interviews in all three countries, I have fallen short of this goal by five people. Notwithstanding this, information drawn from the fifteen interlocutors, coupled with a desk review of relevant documents, certainly helps answer the questions that are at the heart of this research process, and give crucial insights into, as the project name confers, “the role of the Academic Diaspora in the revitalisation of Africa’s Higher Education.”

**Historic and Ongoing Diaspora-led Interventions in Higher Education (beyond Carnegie)**

Consultations with key stakeholders in all three countries affirmed that, though the need for a more sustained academic diaspora engagement for the development of and innovation in tertiary institutions is acknowledged, currently, this demographic has not been corralled effectively into contributing to improvements at the university level. Certainly, there has been an emphasis on harnessing the potentials of a “knowledge” diaspora broadly, but, while the three countries in question have and continue to receive a significant numbers of scholarships offered to civil servants and university students from various partner countries (for example, at various times, Russia, UK, Germany and the United States), these were
programs for, often, short term training established as bilateral agreements and financed outside of the country. As a consequence, these opportunities were not configured to offer sustained engagement with their professional diasporas who were established abroad. One watershed example of such a program is the 1960 Tom Mboya facilitated “airlifts to America,” which happened between 1959-1963 in Kenya. In addition to these bilateral education initiatives, there have been many “informal” smaller scale efforts, which, Zeleza (2013) asserts, come out of the personal relationships of the academic diaspora. These could be individual or once off state supported schemes to engage in research, support teaching, mentoring or the facilitation of exchanges in local institutions, as but a few examples (see also Foulds and Zeleza 2014). Furthermore, both individual or diaspora professional networks, such as the Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association (ENAHPA), are known to have supported particular programs, the construction of infrastructure or direct remittances towards sustaining both institutional and personal higher education goals. Similarly, Zeleza (2013, 10) also points out that members of the academic diaspora, from various countries in Africa, have also contributed to tertiary education improvements on the continent through consultancies they have been engaged in.

The Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) Program, hosted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), is “a capacity-building programme, which helps to mobilize competencies acquired by African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa's development” (see IOM 2018; Plaza and Ratha 2011, 24). The MIDA project builds on IOM’s Return of Qualified African Nationals project that was established in 1974, and operates in a number of African countries (Plaza and Ratha 2011). It was initially endorsed by the AU, then known as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2001 (IOM 2018), and Rwanda and Ethiopia are among about fifteen countries in the region that have set up local MIDA projects (MIDA 2004). While there are widely cited examples of the work the academic diaspora from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have done in their respective countries as part of the MIDA project, it is not clear how and whether the knowledge diaspora from Ethiopia and Rwanda contributed to tertiary education in their countries within the ambit of this program.

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2 Tom Mboya was a renowned Kenyan trade unionist and member of the first post-independence cabinet of Kenya. These “airlifts,” which enabled a significant number of Kenyan students to study in America, were seen as a result of his engagements with John F Kennedy and Martin Luther King.

3 I am grateful for Dr Girum Maheteme of IGAD for bringing my attention to the work of the Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association (ENAHPA). See more of the work of this diaspora organization here: http://enahpa.org Zeleza (2013, 9) also highlights the work of other professional associations constituted by, for example, the Senegalese and Nigerian diaspora in North America.
Notwithstanding their impact, the aforementioned interventions occur within a context where all actors, including faith based institutions,\(^4\) recognize the great need to more systematically mobilize the diaspora to support local higher education activities, even when they are cognizant of and are seeking to address some of the obstacles to such engagements, foremost of which is resources. Speaking to these challenges, the Head of the Diaspora Agency at the Kenya Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Michael Oyugi, shared that:

Finance can be a big issue, because government does not have funds that are devoted to this line. We have funds that come to general diaspora department activities but not this line [diaspora education engagement]. But even what we have is not enough. When you come to prioritizing, maybe that is when the question of a shortfall of funds is clear. We often find ourselves in a situation when we are driven to deal with what is urgent. In our case, this is largely consular matters, Kenyans in all sorts of distress. And so the policy lends itself more to those kinds of interventions rather than what can be looked at as futuristic, and which does not manifest itself as clearly.

With a close to two decades long interest in engaging its diaspora, what could be taken as a nascent government and diaspora supported education program is the financial support given to Rwandese students who study abroad by the Rwandese state. Many of these students return to Rwanda and enter both the market place and educational institutions. Highlighting these efforts, Emmanuel Murangayisa of the education section of the Development Bank of Rwanda stated:

We support students abroad, and they come back. And they enter the market; a certain number will go to the education sector. The loans given to students studying abroad is about 10% of our budget. The local number is very high: 28,000 students in local institutions, and about 500 students who go abroad. Those abroad focus on STEM. And the ones who come back make good contributions.\(^5\)

Though this appears to be a unique quasi diaspora-harnessing approach, not evident in any of the other two countries examined, it is not yet framed or instrumentalized as a collaborative government and diaspora supported education programme. If our “goal is to make systems,” as Tewabech Bishaw of ABIDE implores, it is both foundation or donor supported programs which have been able to systematically showcase and mobilize the skills of the diaspora in all three countries; initiatives that consistently re-establish this

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\(^4\) Mwenda Ntarangwi, of the Commission for University Education (CUE) in Kenya, recounted his involvement, as “diaspora,” within faith-based US-Kenya university exchanges.

\(^5\) Unfortunately I do not have figures for the exact number of these students who have come back after receiving government supported education abroad.
demographics’ importance for both innovation and structural improvements at African universities. Beyond the four Carnegie Corporation supported programs (PADA, CADFP, Wits and CODESRIA), the African Institute for Mathematics (AIMS), the University of the Western Cape and Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo have, through similar funding arrangements, utilized diaspora expertise to develop and advance programmes and curricula (Fritelli 2018).

As indicated earlier, the funding for these previous and ongoing initiatives has assembled both foreign and local actors, diaspora and otherwise. Though contributed to by a broad range of constituents, such platforms, ultimately, provide both the model and building blocks from which to launch and sustain locally driven and financed diaspora-inclusive higher education initiatives in all three countries. At the same time, beyond resources, adequate policy frameworks are much needed to prompt and inscribe potential programmes. It is to the state, regional and non-state frameworks that can ground potential diaspora-inclusive higher education support, to which I now turn.

State, Regional and Non-State Frameworks that support these initiatives
In recognition of the impact this demographic can have on national development, all three countries have established national diaspora engagement policies: Ethiopia in 2013, Kenya in 2014 and Rwanda in 2009. These policies were enacted during a period when various states in the region were also “granting dual citizenship or special overseas citizenship cards” and establishing directorates and agencies for their diasporas in both relevant local ministries as well as abroad. These developments have also been coupled with the promotion of diaspora databases, networks (for example the Rwanda Global Diaspora Network (RGCN) established in 2009 and the National Diaspora Council of Kenya (NADICOK)) and more frequent state driven consultations with this demographic (Zeleza 2013, 20). In Rwanda, the “diaspora engagement policy” was anchored in the goals of their national development plan Vision 2020 (Fransen and Siegel 2011). Related, in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund (EDTF), established to encourage the Ethiopian diaspora to give $1 a day to “finance people-focused social and economic development projects” (see EDTF website 2019), is an important local step towards enabling the diaspora to support much needed developmental projects, including those in education.

At a regional level, in 2003, the AU Executive Council agreed to “actively engage the African diaspora,” and in 2005 this demographic was formerly designated as the “sixth region” of the “AU’s
structure.” The existence of the Citizens and Diaspora Directorate (CIDO) of the AU also strengthens and complements the diaspora focused work going on at the various levels of the organization. At the same time, Plaza and Ratha (2011, 36) reported that since at the AU “the mechanisms and the process for diaspora engagement are still being worked out,” this “is causing some frustration among diaspora communities.” Similarly, and as was reported during key informant interviews, there is much more focus directed towards encouraging diaspora investment and trade at the local level (see, for example, Plaza and Ratha 2011; as well as, even, the diaspora targeted bank accounts by, for example, Equity Bank in Kenya), and, while the much needed meta-level diaspora policies are in place, there remains no explicit policies established to mobilize and sustain engagements with the academic diaspora.

Having a more favourable view about this, Zeleza (2013) shares that “although the academic diaspora are often not specifically targeted, these strategies have created a more auspicious environment for universities to develop effective policies and strategies for academic diaspora engagement.” Yet, there is also the lack of an “infrastructure to support” diaspora academics in African universities, and this is coupled with some “negative” stereotypes about this demographic that exacerbate already precarious conditions (Zeleza 2013). Speaking to the lack of specific policies targeting diaspora academics at the national level, Ambassador Michael Oyugi of the Diaspora Agency in Kenya shared that:

First, the diaspora policy does not focus specifically on education but it talks of skills, and these skills are various; whether they are doctors, lawyers or engineers. In terms of education, meaning training and development of skills, there is no particular focus. But we are working on that in a way that is not direct: we are engaging our academicians, especially in the US. It is haphazard, but we are looking out for Kenyan academicians and persuading them to help with skills development. Either they come back and spend some time in local institutions, or help local universities to build capacity and scholarships etc.

In Ethiopia, Ayenachew Woldergiyorgis, who is researching the involvement of its diaspora in higher education in the country, shared that for most citizens “there is no clear understanding of what the policy is. Also different universities have different ideas of what the diaspora is: Gonder has one idea and a new university has another idea, and there is no overwhelming policy that they use.” And when it comes to the recently launched Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund (EDTF), Woldergiyorgis emphasizes that the “EDTF is focused on very basic services, and no decisions have been made yet for where the money is going.”
In all three countries examined, small scale diaspora-inclusive or led initiatives for higher education continue and dominate, and these have been accompanied by national policies – such as the diaspora policies – and formal and informal initiatives that seek to attract and support this demographic. However, as was attested to during the interviews with key stakeholders, while important, these efforts have targeted the diaspora broadly, and do not have a specific focus on the knowledge diaspora. In the following sections, and through the three case studies, I attend to the second question at the heart of this research process: What local mechanisms are available or should exist to financially support the enhanced participation of the African diaspora in higher education, research and innovation in Africa?

Kenya Case Study

Informed by his professional role as well as his experience as a diaspora returnee, the current Vice Chancellor of Riara University, Professor Robert Gateru, affirmed the importance of attracting the academic diaspora to his university’s operations. In his analysis, he sees:

The benefit in the international exposure [they enable], which brings a completely different dynamic to the class since the instructor has broader perspectives. This is important. They also have more open minds and a good number have very good work ethic and culture. Also, people coming from abroad have gone through different styles of teaching, and they are more responsive to student needs. Beyond this, the networks they have become very useful when they return to Kenya. For the faculty at Riara who have studied abroad, they also include a lot of guest lecturers in their classes; they have lots of people coming to do guest lectures from abroad because of the connections they had when they were there [abroad].

This statement makes evident the extensive benefits that the Kenyan academic diaspora can bring to local classrooms, and that can have cascading effects into different levels of the university. The diaspora-inclusive interventions at Riara, that prompted these observations, were as a product of both personal relationships, and more recently as a result of the Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Program (CADFP). Unfortunately, Kenya is yet to have a state supported initiative that can mobilize this demographic in a structured way. Highlighting this, Ambassador Oyugi shared:
I am not aware of any other diaspora higher education initiatives [beyond CADFP]. Some of them are almost at an individual stage so you would not call them initiatives, so you really would not say that they are initiatives. […] I don’t have the numbers off my fingertips, but we have had a number of lecturers coming to the University of Nairobi, USIU and Kisii University -- Kisii university has done well in this regard. And we have a loose forum… maybe forum is too loose. I know that Carnegie made some facilitation efforts in this respect. I have been involved in a Carnegie’s discussion on exchanges that would lead to academicians coming back. So when Carnegie ends, we may be a bit in a quagmire if this funding ends, but we are trying to reach out to our own diaspora.

Fear of this “quagmire” were echoed by other local interviewees, who lauded the structure of the CAFDP and lamented that similar local efforts had not yet been possible at a national level in Kenya due to, above all, the lack of clear policy to support the academic diaspora at both the state and university level, as well as finances. In terms of finances, this is, above all, government resources to establish a comparable program, or, even, in some cases, the inability to pay diaspora academics remuneration similar to what they had been receiving elsewhere. There is also the lack of financing for facilities – from both housing to labs—that this demographic would require. However, there were also more situated dynamics to attend to when it came to this demographic, subtleties that went beyond the scale of the political-economy, such as socio-cultural dynamics tensions that allowed for the fragmentation of the diaspora along ethnic and party lines. In addition, there was also the recognition that only a minority could be considered the academic diaspora – many Kenyans abroad were working in what could be considered hand to mouth conditions. Furthermore, and as elaborated in a number of documents (see for example Moock and Namuddu 2017; Zeleza 2013) the lack of clarity, efficiency and organization that diaspora academics encounter in some local institutions, works to diminish both their interest in and the impact of such knowledge exchanges. On this, Professor Gateru states that:

Other impediments are conducive workplaces and workspaces, and also clear procedures on how things are accomplished -- this is also not there. There are no clear expectations and procedures. For us, it really depends on who is in office: it is a personalized governance structure for public work.

There is also the reality that the Kenyan academic diaspora may be unwilling to come to Kenya for a variety of political and personal reasons (see Abide 2013 for similar apprehensions in Ethiopia). Gesturing to all of these concerns, Ambassador Oyugi added:
The challenges I would notice are a bit different: in terms of proper organization on both sides, on the diaspora side and our side. The diaspora are also fragmented. They are also fragmented along lines that don’t help -- political or ethnic lines, and so they tend to operate in groupings that are created along those lines, and tend to have their own interlocutors. So what they can do is only parochial, and this fragmentation is also a drawback. On our side we need to develop better mechanisms. Also because the [academic] diaspora would sometimes wonder what can be in it for them: What as a government can we offer the diaspora that they can look forward to? What do we give them in return for instance? What do we offer them? That could be part of the problem. There is fragmentation on this end as there is no concrete policy or structure that can encourage diaspora to participate, knowing that this is an investment that can give them returns -- like remittances or buying property. This is a matter of concern. But then again the diaspora is also limited in terms of ability, whether they have the capacity to engage in the kinds of areas of work that we imagine, that we would like to see them do. A good part of the diaspora can be just above hand to mouth existence. So having that critical mass of the willing and able is important.

The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Commission for University Education (CUE), himself a diaspora returnee, also echoed the apprehensions expressed by Ambassador Oyugi and Professor Gateru. While they and other interlocutors consulted understand that a more explicit policy environment is needed to encourage better knowledge exchange with the diaspora, it is also important to ask: what kinds of local financing should exist to make this a possibility? The following section attends to this question.

**Policy and Financing of Diaspora-Inclusive Higher Education Programs in Kenya**

A key impediment to both the policy and financing of diaspora-inclusive higher education is the lack of data that exists about this demographic. This leads to the question asked by the Mwenda Ntarangwi: “How do we match skill to need?” As a precursor to policy, Professor Gateru emphasized the need for a diaspora database when he argued:

> For those who want to return fully, the first issue is that there is no database for these people. There should be a database for them, and efforts to start speaking to each of them, and it would make it very easy […]. But even for Kenyans, even if there is a diaspora desk in some of the ministries, we don’t know about them or the support they can provide since they [the government] may also not have up to date databases that map the expertise available in the diaspora.

Currently, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) alumni network has a repository of members that they successfully rely on to communicate and prompt collaborative educational activities, many of which are intentionally aligned with the current regimes’ development itinerary – The Big Four
Agenda, which targets improvements in manufacturing, food security, affordable housing and health services. This database, however, is not public, and neither is the professional database that Africa Works, is collecting in a number of African countries. Therefore, concomitant to mapping the diaspora across all relevant geographies, there is the need to have clear national policies that support the incorporation of the diaspora into post-secondary institution operations. Through the Kenya Diaspora Policy (2014), as well as, for example, the Sector Plan for Science Technology and Innovation (2013) and the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) Strategic Plan (2018 – 2022), there are enough guidelines to facilitate less fragmented knowledge diaspora-inclusive policies, as well as to develop, as suggested by Mwenda Ntarangwi, a sessional paper on this demographic that can be tabled in parliament as a means to catalyze and garner backing for more concrete practices to support the academic diasporas’ engagement in the country. At the level of the university, there are also meetings taking place between vice chancellors, diaspora academics and the Commission for University Education (CUE) to establish what infrastructural support is needed to encourage Kenyan diaspora academics to be involved with local institutions.

These steps can also encourage national budgetary allocations, as well as private sector support: all interlocutors interviewed suggested that, in view of a constrained resource purse at both the national and university level, the private sector can be approached to help finance academic diaspora initiatives in the country. This can include negotiating with Kenya Airways, local hotels or other short-term accommodation facilities to offer significantly discounted rates for the knowledge diaspora. Proposing the merging of financial responsibilities – between the government, the diaspora and the private sector, Professor Gateru conveyed:

In terms of money, this has to be agreed upon at the policy level in government. The government has to be committed to this. Unless the government makes that a priority item, then most of the other initiatives may have limited success. Once the government has made this a priority for them and made this a strategic objective, then it becomes easier to get money. Even, once it is a national priority, the donors can support things that are a national priority. It makes this possible. We can have a kitty and the diaspora can contribute over and above sending money to relatives. [In addition] Industry can be persuaded through the Kenya

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6 Personal communication by Margaret Kirui of the DAAD alumni network in Nairobi.
7 Supported by Carnegie Corporation, Africa Works is currently putting together a database of expertise on the continent. See more about this initiative here: https://www.africaworks.net/#our-mission-section
8 This was communicated to me by Mwenda Ntarangwi, the CEO of the Commission for University Education in Kenya.
Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) -- I have just been added as a member of the education sector board within KEPSA. KEPSA is able to mobilize government quite well, because they have presidential roundtables. If the president agrees then it can be pushed down to the ministries. Beyond the government, industry should chip in to the fund, maybe the African Development Bank, and it can be crafted in a way that is a revolving fund, where the receiving institutions or diaspora can chip in something small, and we make it easy for people to contribute. But the biggest party to it, of course, is government, but only if they see if as a strategic objective for the country or the continent.

Certainly, while collaborative public and private financing was suggested to catalyze more structured academic diaspora engagements in the country, no actual financing model structure was offered during discussions with my Kenyan interlocutors. At the same time, while affirming the potential of the diaspora to “chip in” to these initiatives, both Mwenda Ntarangwi and Ambassador Oyugi recognized that, in view of the alarming corruption levels in the government, “Kenyans could be reluctant to give into a diaspora trust fund depending on who is managing it.” Notwithstanding these concerns, there appear to be some steps towards creating relevant policy, however fragmented and broad, and this is coupled with ongoing university discussions about how to engage more concretely with Kenya’s academic diaspora. These events, however nascent, can be the stepping-stones towards finding locally initiated financing for these activities.

**Rwanda Case Study**

Much earlier than both Kenya and Ethiopia, Rwanda developed a Diaspora Policy: the Rwanda Diaspora Policy was published by the Ministry of External Relations in June 2009 (Fransen and Siegel 2011). This policy has been embedded within Rwanda’s long-term development plan, and the diaspora is also considered instrumental to the objectives of the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2020), amongst other national visions. Ultimately, the diaspora “is to be engaged in development processes by means of financial transfers, knowledge and skill transfers, contributions to technology development, export promotion, and the promotion of Rwandan culture (Fransen and Siegel 2011).

Even before the Diaspora Policy, however, Rwanda intentionally sought to engage its diaspora in a number of different initiatives, and these efforts have now endured for close to two decades. To these ends,
the “sixth province” of Rwanda, as the diaspora is colloquially known, has since 2000 been enrolled in a number of socio-political and economic activities, a significant number of which have been conducted through the Rwanda Global Diaspora Network (RGDN) – an umbrella network of “Rwandan Communities abroad” (RGDN 2019). A key goal of this diaspora outreach has been peace building and unity (Fransen and Siegel 2011) since, while the diaspora is recognized for its potential, its “negative” aspects and reputation for hostility have also been noted (Turner 2013; IRDP 2019).

**Policy and Financing of Diaspora-Inclusive Higher Education Programs in Rwanda**

Rwanda’s close to twenty-year engagement with its diaspora has enabled the development of an established and comprehensive diaspora inclusive policy framework. From the 2009 Diaspora Policy, to the operations of the Rwanda Global Diaspora Network (RGDN) organization, to the Diaspora General Directorate (DGD), within the Ministry of External Relations and Internal Cooperation, which was established in June 2008. These platforms show that there are, certainly, systems in place that govern the “linkages between Rwanda and its citizens abroad” (Fransen and Siegel 2011). This could be why, as President Paul Kagame asserted at a Next Einstein Forum in Kigali in March 2018, 80 – 85% of Rwandans who studied abroad have come back home (Frittelli 2018).

At the same time, it appears that an overwhelming focus of the Diaspora General Directorate (DGD) is the investment potential of the diaspora, and much less attention is directed to the knowledge exchange potential of this demographic. However, it is also important to note that through its collaborations with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) the expertise of its professional and academic diaspora have been engaged to some extent. Highlighting this, an IOM Diaspora Mapping Rwanda Factsheet (2018) reports on the results of the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) scheme in the country, and shares that:

The main objective of the TOKTEN programme was to reverse the ‘brain drain’ by encouraging Rwandan nationals to provide their expertise, transfer of knowhow and skills, through short-term volunteering as UN Volunteers. The TOKTEN programme was implemented from December 2005 to December 2007 through a partnership between the Government of Rwanda and UNDP. The evaluation findings indicated that the project was by and large highly successful, and achieved most of its objectives. 47 volunteers were recruited from about six countries, mainly the USA and Canada. The greatest number of volunteers had science and
technology backgrounds, followed by those with agriculture, health and ICT backgrounds. Furthermore, the volunteers were highly qualified, with 21 of them having PhDs and 19 master’s degrees. They were also highly motivated by patriotism, and nine of them returned permanently to Rwanda after serving as volunteers.

Though there is barely any data that exists to tally the effectiveness of Rwanda’s “brain gain” efforts (Fransen and Siegel 2011, 1), narratives such as those above do much to encourage the scaling-up of ongoing projects, and, even, the creation of a sustainable nationally implemented and financed diaspora-inclusive knowledge exchange model. When asked how such a process could be funded, Benjamin Nyakeriga of the Development Bank of Rwanda (BRD) spoke about Social Impact Bonds (SIB) also sometimes referred to as Development Impact Bonds (DIB). These bonds have been used around the world to fund a number of social outcomes, and Nyakeriga discussed how the government could, through “socially-motivated” local private or even diaspora investors, “mobilize private financing for social public policies in the general interest.” These actors will “provide working capital to social sector service providers, allowing them to be able to scale up high-impact social programmes” and the government will then return this capital after the success of the outcome. In addition, “if outcomes fail to improve, investors do not recover their full investment, thereby transferring the performance risk of the programme away from government and taxpayers.” (Nyakeriga 2019). The operations of such a bond can be visualized in Figure 1 below.

In view of the success of these bonds in the US, UK, Peru, Netherlands and India, Nyakeriga suggested their utility in funding education at various levels in Rwanda (Nyakeriga 2019), and proposed that the diaspora can be engaged both as investors and as critical human resources at the post-secondary level. The bond could be used not only to improve local facilities, but, as well, to create more favourable working conditions for both local and diaspora academics. If coupled with more explicit diaspora policies attuned to the needs of the Rwandan knowledge diaspora, these instruments, provincialized to local socio-political and economic dynamics, offer one possible financing model for diaspora-inclusive higher education initiatives locally and for the continent broadly.
Social Impact Bonds

Since “during the emperor’s time and following the expansion of education in the country, Ethiopians used to come back and serve their country after they completed their education in Europe and North America,” the Ethiopian diaspora has grown significantly “following the overthrow of the monarchy by the dictatorial military regime,” allowing that Ethiopia is now one of “the top ten sources of migration in [to] North America” (Government of Ethiopia, 2013; see also Kuschminder and Siegel 2011, 5).

Likely motivated by this large and growing diaspora, Kushminder and Siegel (2011, 3) report that “since 2002, the Government of Ethiopia has become one of the most active countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in engaging the diaspora.” Certainly the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs, the recently established Diaspora Engagement Affairs Directorate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Diaspora Units in different consulates, the 2013 Diaspora Policy, as well as the lauded Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund (EDTF), which
has raised close to four million dollars in under a year, make evident the strides the country has taken to reach out to its close to two million diaspora members around the world (see also ABIDE 2013; see also Kuschminder and Siegel 2011, 9).

It important to point out the key role that the Diaspora Coordinating Office of the Ministry of Interior has, with particular regard to “facilit[ing] brain gain and capacity building ” (Kuschminder and Siegel 2011, 13 – 14). In this regard, Kuschminder and Siegel (2011) list the core objectives of this office, and these are listed in the text box below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 1: The Five Objectives of the Diaspora Coordinating Office</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Advocate for mobilize and link Ethiopian professionals globally for increased opportunities for brain gain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Promote collaboration between aspiring professional trainees in the diaspora and professionals and institutions in the country to strengthen partnership for experience, knowledge and skills transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ensure compilation and maintenance of up-to-date and holistic data on qualified human resource needs of institutions in the country as well as data on available professional and technical resource within the diaspora and friends of Ethiopia communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Facilitate increased coordination and challenging of available intellectual and technical resources from the Ethiopian diaspora and from friends of Ethiopian to contribute to institutional capacity building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Assist institutions locally to improve their efficiency in accessing and utilizing diasporas’ intellectual and technical resources to meet their developmental goals.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Correspondingly, the diaspora is also solicited to have roles that include assisting the “transfer of knowledge by coordination and facilitating the transfer of skill and knowledge of expatriates and friends of Ethiopia, and to identify and introduce practical processes, procedures and international standards that will improve the Ethiopian public, business and social sector’s efficiency and effectiveness” (Kuschminder and Siegel 2011, 13). This supportive infrastructure at a national level is coupled at the regional level with branches of the diaspora Coordinating Offices that also engage directly with the diaspora abroad. At an inter-institutional level, the Technical Committee of Federal Government Institutions on emigrant community provides co-ordination across the different levels of government on diaspora policy. Finally, the Ethiopian Investment Agency and the Development Bank of Ethiopia are financial institutions under the Ethiopian National Bank (ENB) that are involved in diaspora (Kushman and Siegel 2011, 11).
As shared earlier, together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) the government “administrates” the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) program, and through it qualified members of the Ethiopian diaspora return to the country for a period of six months or more to fill “critical skill gaps” in ministries and public institutions. Funding for this derives from both the Ministry of Interior, which pays for the flights and the housing of diaspora members, and the United National Development Programme (UNDP) that covers other related costs. A key focus of the program has been universities, and a much touted success has been the collaboration with the Ethiopian North American Health Professionals Association (ENAPHA), who have continued to send members to conduct “training, lectures and workshops” with medical professionals in the country (Kushminder and Siegel 2011; MIDA 2004).

Notwithstanding these efforts, there have not been explicit large-scale initiatives or legislation adopted to reach, principally, the country’s highly qualified knowledge diaspora.9 This occurs even as the Diaspora Policy makes specific reference to “enhancing knowledge and technology transfer” through providing “employment opportunities” and the chance for members of the diaspora to “serve in the country’s higher educational institutions and technical and vocational colleges” (see 5.3 section of the Diaspora Policy). Speaking to this, Tewabech Bishaw, the founder and manager of the Alliance for Brain Gain in Inclusive Development (ABIDE), applauds the strides made by the government thus far, but emphasized the need to have specific policies and funding that targeted Ethiopia’s academic diaspora. These concerns were echoed by Ayenachew Woldegiyorgis, an Ethiopian PhD student at Boston College, whose research seeks to understand the structures, material (such as policies) and immaterial (such as political situation), that need to be put in place so as to influence both institutional and national policy that will be oriented to attracting the country’s knowledge diaspora, and, subsequently, allow them have a more sustained engagement with local tertiary educations. Beyond the reality that “there is no clear understanding of what the [diaspora] policy is,” at the level of the university “different universities have different ideas of what diaspora is.” This is combined with the lack of clear guidelines and practices for how to receive and engage this demographic at universities, as well as the inadequacy of facilities that diaspora academics may be used to, such as, for example, astronomy facilities if that is their field.10

9 Personal communication from Tewabech Bishaw.
10 Ayenachew Woldegiyorgis personal communication.
The lack of an overarching infrastructure is coupled with uncertainty over the political situation in Ethiopia, in view of the regional protests and attempted coups in the first half of 2019. One interlocutor suggested that these events have reproduced ethnic fragmentation in the diaspora, amongst a demographic that is already conceived locally as more antagonistic to the government. These ethno-political divisions have seen segments of the diaspora seek to “get back” the contributions they made to the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund (EDTF). In addition, the political and economic situation also fueled personal reservations about leaving a career in North America or elsewhere that was long in the making, or traveling back to Ethiopia with young children (see Zeleza (2013) for this as well). As a consequence, as was shared by Woldegiyorgis, many of the Ethiopian academics he consulted for his research suggested that they would engage more intentionally in knowledge transfer activities in the country when they were retired.

Despite these concerns, all Ethiopian interviewees asserted that many members of their academic diaspora are involved in or invested in national education outcomes at a smaller level -- individually and through professional associations. The question remains, against the need to scale up, what sustainable funding avenues can be made available to finance both small scale (if this is preferred) and potential national level diaspora-inclusive higher education initiatives?

**Policy and Financing of Diaspora-Inclusive Higher Education Programs in Ethiopia**

Without a doubt, the success of the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund (EDTF) makes evident the willingness of the Ethiopian diaspora to raise money for national developmental goals. Woldegiyorgis suggests that this fund was set up with the recognition that if the diaspora was three million people, “1$ a day for Ethiopia,” as President Abiy Ahmed implored, could potentially raise three million dollars every day. So far, the amount of monies raised through the fund amounts to just over four million dollars, which is still a remarkable feat considering that a large segment of the diaspora are working in non-professional jobs in North America, the Middle East and Europe (Kuschminder and Siegel 2011; see also Government of Ethiopia 2013). However, despite the monies raised through the EDTF, Tewabech Abishaw of ABIDE asserts that:

> It does not have a component for knowledge exchange. I met with the Diaspora Agency in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to highlight this, and to emphasize that the fund should also be used for knowledge exchange, or the knowledge trust fund becomes a separate trust fund to ensure that enough money is pooled into that resource until the system and the legal framework is established for how to use that fund. And universities
can also play an active role. It should not be the only source, but it should feed the need. If the EDTF is going to be the only fund, then let us have a piece of the pie. If it is not going to work then we need to have our own fund.

Prior to the EDTF, Tewabech Abishaw, adds:

Before Abiy came to power, ABIDE was working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- we got the policy. And then we also knew the need for a pool of resources: the Ministries of Education, Health, Foreign Affairs and Science and Technology -- we worked together and we agreed that we need funds. So ABIDE wrote a concept paper for a Knowledge Diaspora Trust Fund. We submitted this to the government. Based on that concept note we developed, we started to work on a legal framework, legislation, how to engage the diaspora for knowledge capacity building. While we were working on that Abiy came to power. And then we were told oh the prime minister is pushing this thing and we should hold. I said we park it but we will make sure that it sees the light again. So we have a draft policy on the Knowledge Diaspora Trust Fund. It was specifically focused on creating a pool of resources to be chipped in to by different players and governments, and those institutions that would benefit from the diaspora. And the governance of this was to be well developed, established, and administered, composed by NGOs like ABIDE, the World Bank, USAID and ministries.

While the proposed Knowledge Diaspora Trust Fund is still in the works, and continues to be a possibility in view of the success of the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund, funding for diaspora-inclusive higher education initiatives continue to be financed by universities, personal or professional association funds, MIDA and Fulbright opportunities. In addition, since Ethiopia has experience issuing Diaspora Investment Bonds (DIB), these “debt instruments” to raise financing from their diaspora could, akin to the Social Impact Bonds (SIB) mentioned earlier, be viable tools to acquire funds for specific national purposes. Since these investment tools are “rooted in patriotism” (Ketkar and Ratha 2012, 127 - 128), and in view of the success of the trust fund and remittances, they could be used to pool resources for the proposed Knowledge Diaspora Trust Fund. In the interim period, a suggestion by Boston College researcher, Ayenachew Woldergyorgis, is that the internet offers a cheap and accessible means for the diaspora to train and mentor students in local institutions, while a larger locally implemented and financed diaspora-inclusive higher education process continues to be developed.
Summary of Innovative Funding Models for Diaspora-Inclusive Higher Education Programs

An analysis of the ongoing diaspora-inclusive higher education projects in all three countries makes evident the dominance of small scale initiatives, all of which are financed in a similar manner: predominantly through either personal funds or professional diaspora association arrangements. Notwithstanding these efforts, Kenya has benefited significantly from the Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Program (CAFDP), while both Ethiopia and Rwanda have gained from UNDP and IOM supported efforts, such as the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOTKEN) and MIDA (Migration For Development in Africa) schemes, although these have suffered, as a MIDA report provides, “from the nature of the relations between the Governments of the countries of origin and their diaspora (IOM 2006, 5).

Through their various bilateral partners, all countries have also received a notable number of training scholarships offered to civil servants and students as a consequence of particular government-to-government arrangements. However, though all are cognizant and are increasingly motivated by the potential of their knowledge diaspora, neither country has developed a comprehensive and explicit policy and finance framework that can support the creation of sustainable large-scale academic diaspora engagements. Nevertheless, key steps have been made in this regard, including the diaspora policies that have been established by each of the states in question.

In terms of financing, the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund offers a successful and transparent means of collecting diaspora contributions towards the advancement of national development goals, since the names of all contributors and their contributions are available on the trust fund website. Ethiopian interlocutors, however, suggested that these some of these funds can be channeled towards diaspora-inclusive higher education outcomes, such as an independent Knowledge Diaspora Trust Fund. For countries like Kenya, where, as suggested by local interviewees, the extensive high-profile corruption cases may make its diaspora reluctant to contribute their hard-earned money towards such an endowment, that the names of all contributors and their contributions will be made public (and hopefully the destination of the monies raised) may allay some of these fears.
Beyond national trust funds, Social Impact Bonds (SIB) were also suggested by Benjamin Nyakeriga, from the Development Bank of Rwanda, as a means to raise financing for social outcomes such as the provincialization of CESA 2016-2025 objectives in a country. Certainly, in view of their success in other parts of the world (UK, Peru, India etc.), these instruments could be used to finance higher education engagements with the diaspora in any of the three countries, with diaspora members or the local private sector providing the initial capital required for the initiative. Similarly, Ketkar and Ratha (2011) promote the use of Diaspora Bonds, against their proven success in Israel and India, and these would also be bought into by the relevant diasporas.

The success of these ventures, however, also depends on the willingness of the diaspora to contribute to them since, as all case studies have shown, fragmentation and hostility exists, to various extents, amongst all the diasporas discussed here. In addition, it is also important to question the role and impetus of the private sector, who are interested primarily in profits, in helping support a public good, since not only is the financing of the commons a state responsibility (and should not be in the financial markets), but, as well, it may create an opportunity for the financiers to exact financial or even political pressure in other areas, in view of the upper hand they may gain from providing the capital for these bonds. Nevertheless, if these instruments can be configured in such away as to be attuned to the socio-political and economic needs and dynamics of a country, they may be the innovative funding model needed to finance diaspora-inclusive and supportive higher education efforts in all three countries, and, in this way, can work to complement and/or even ease the burden on ongoing personal and professional diaspora association initiatives.
Conclusion

This research report has sought to answer the following questions:

1) *What are the historical and ongoing diaspora led interventions in higher education other than Carnegie supported programs on the continent? What are the policy frameworks that support these initiatives, and what successes, milestones and challenges have they enabled?*

2) *What local mechanisms are available or should exist to financially support the enhanced participation of the African diaspora in higher education, research and innovation in Africa?*

By tracking both past and ongoing historical diaspora-inclusive higher education initiatives in all three countries, as well as the policy frameworks that have subsequently been enacted in Kenya, Rwanda and Ethiopia over the last decade, the gaps and possibilities for diaspora-supportive academic interventions become clearer. Certainly, the strides to include this demographic in developmental objectives, at both a personal and state level, is commendable. However, while the needs for “knowledge transfer” or exchange with the diaspora is emphasized in all country contexts, there remains no explicit policy that targets the academic diaspora, and this is at both the state level and within tertiary institutions. This allows for a situation where formal invitations to the knowledge diaspora exist (through Ministries and diaspora associations etc.), but they encounter an informal (and sometimes “personalized,” as was suggested by one interlocutor) environment; conditions that are not favourable to their careers, local students and institutions. Such situations occur within a resource-constrained environment, thus reducing the impact of what are already few and short-term initiatives.

In terms of financing, while governments make some contributions, whether in-kind or monetary, to academic diaspora targeting activities, such as the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOTKEN) in Rwanda and MIDA (Migration For Development in Africa) in Ethiopia, what is required for both the scalability and sustainability of such knowledge transfer activities is local resources, and this would be complemented by a policy framework attuned to the needs of this demographic. Social Impact Bonds, Diaspora Bonds and trust funds (such as the Ethiopian Diaspora Trust Fund) have been examined here as possible financing tools. However, if reliant on both the diaspora and private sector for capital, there is
always the risk that the fragmentation within the diaspora can affect “buy-in” to such programs. In the case of Kenya, fears of more corruption may also impede the receptivity of the diaspora to these ventures. In addition, it is also important to question the role of the private sector in providing public goods, since its key goal is, overwhelmingly, is profit, and, as a consequence, in financing academic social outcomes may expect quid-pro-quo arrangements in other spheres. At the same time, if configured to respond to situational dynamics, Social Impact Bonds (SIB), Diaspora Bonds (DB) and trust funds may be novel approaches to respond to the broad financing needs of diaspora-inclusive higher education outcomes.

The need for a comprehensive database that accounts for the academic diaspora, as well as available tertiary level opportunities for this demographic in their countries of origin, was also cited as a key gap in the policy–financing equation. As such, the creation of such a repository would be a complementary tool to bridge both the demand for and supply of the knowledge diaspora against available resources, and go a long way to enabling not just one approach to academic diaspora engagements, but instead, what Tewabech Bishaw of ABIDE referred to as, a scalable and sustainable academic “system.” In addition, it appears that an overwhelming focus has been directed towards the academic diasporas established in North America and Europe, the “global North,” with less attention given to Kenyan/Ethiopian/Rwandan born academics in Asia, the Caribbean and Pacific Island countries, as but a few examples. Likely this has to do with the volume of African born academics living in the global North, and, even, the few relevant embassies or consulates in these regions. However, by intentionally seeking to harness “African core values” wherever they have been transplanted, this will allow for more robust efforts directed to “achieving the vision and ambitions of the African Union” as the Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) 2016 – 2025 envisions.
Appendix 1

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Appendix 2

Questions for Stakeholders

- What is your current role/mandate of your organization?
- Are you part of the diaspora?
- What is your experience engaging the diaspora?
- How do you see the role of the diaspora in higher education?
- Do you see any benefit to higher education by engaging with diaspora?
- How would you envision engaging the diaspora?
- What are your main concerns with diaspora engagement in higher education?
- What would it take for your organization to include diaspora engagement in your set of priorities?
- How are you contributing to higher education in your country as an individual/government department/non-governmental agency?
- What historical and ongoing interventions by the diaspora are you aware of?
- What challenges do they face?
- What were the successes?
- Has your government/private sector been supportive?
- What can be done better to improve diaspora-inclusive interventions in higher education?
- How do you find financing for your interventions?
- What avenues for finance mobilization or alternative business models exist to support the role of the diaspora in higher education institutions on the continent?